The Islamic State in Somalia is an ISIS affiliate based in Puntland. It rose from a splinter of al-Shabaab in 2015, benefiting from regional clan connections to engage in smuggling and extortion. Although it has recently faced significant defeats, particularly in 2025, the group’s operations and potential for recruitment remain concerning. Despite claims of global leadership, its actual influence is limited compared to larger jihadist groups in Africa.
The Islamic State in Somalia, an affiliate of ISIS, emerged in Puntland and was targeted by President Trump’s administration in its initial foreign combat operation in February 2025. Known for planning attacks on international landmarks, such as the Vatican and the Israeli embassy in Stockholm, the group has faced notable resistance and recent defeats as assessed by jihadism researcher Stig Jarle Hansen.
The Islamic State in Somalia originated in 2015 from a splinter group of al-Shabaab, which had previously established its presence in the region. The group benefitted from connections to the Ali Suleiban sub-clan, which were crucial for smuggling operations and maritime piracy, taking advantage of Puntland’s geographical significance in trade between Somalia and the broader Middle East.
Sheikh Abdulqader Muumin, the leader of the Islamic State in Somalia, previously lived in Sweden and the UK before joining al-Shabaab. His prominence grew through jihadist propaganda until he defected to establish the Islamic State faction. Mahad Moalim, his second-in-command, also belonged to the same clan, which facilitated the group’s financial operations through extortion and other illicit activities.
The Islamic State in Somalia gained notoriety, particularly for a suicide bombing in 2017 that allowed it to extort protection money from local businesses. Officially recognized as a province of ISIS in July 2018, the group also became responsible for regions in central Africa, enabling it to generate substantial income through local operations, despite its smaller troop numbers compared to al-Shabaab.
Despite its global image, the group’s actual power and presence in Somalia have been overstated. With an estimated 600 to 1,600 fighters in 2024, its capabilities fall significantly short when compared to al-Shabaab. Attempts to link the group to significant international attacks have been questioned, and there are doubts about Muumin’s leadership status within ISIS.
Puntland authorities initiated a successful counter-offensive in January 2025, notably gaining ground against the Islamic State with US air support, resulting in significant casualties for the group. By March 2025, key bases had fallen, causing a notable decline in its morale, but the group remains active. Many fighters retained their ability to operate within the rugged terrain, suggesting that the threat from the Islamic State in Somalia is not completely extinguished, especially with ongoing funding sources from local extortion and the potential for recruitment among displaced populations.
The Islamic State in Somalia, though once rising in prominence, faces significant setbacks but remains operational and capable of threat due to its resourcefulness in extortion and recruitment strategies. Leadership doubts and diminished military presence do not erase the group’s capacity for survival amidst Puntland’s rugged landscape, necessitating continued vigilance and counteraction. As the situation evolves, the vulnerabilities and resilience of both the Islamic State and counter-forces in Somalia will shape the region’s security landscape.
Original Source: www.inkl.com
